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*Summary
This paper discusses the events that led to the Asian crisis, the management of the
crisis and how it has affected some ofNorway's most important development partners,
South Afrca, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, and Bangladesh. The term
"The Asian crisis" encapsulates three different, but interrelated, crises, a financial
crisis, a currency crisis and an economic crisis.
Four countries have been particularly adversely affected by the economic turmoil;
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. All of these countres have
experienced currency depreciation of at least fifty per cent, a strong reduction in the
value of sto eks and properties, increasing unemployment rates, and contraction of
economic activity. Estimates suggest that the decrease in Gross Domestie Product in
1998 has been approximately i 5 per cent for Indonesia, and between 6 and 10 per
cent for Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand. Other countries in Asia have been less
severely hit by the problems, but economic growth in the region, which has been the
faste st in the world for several years, has been substantially reduced.
Our analysis shows that the effect of the currency and financial crises is neglIgible for
all development partners included in this study, except South Afrca. The economic
crisis in Asia, which refers to a reduction of Asian demand and economic activity, has
some, but lImited, implIcation for Norway's development parners.
The financial and currency crises in Asia led to a reduction of investors' confidenee in
the deve10pment of "emerging market economies," resulting in a massive withdrawal
of capital. This affected South Afrca, which experienced a higher risk premium in
international markets. For the other countries analyzed in this study, however, the
increased risk premiums in international capital markets were of relatively lIttle
importance. The main re as on for this is that the countries are not integrated into the
international financial markets as they mainly rely on donor money rather than
financing from private sources.
The fast growing economies of Asia have been a significant driving force for the
international economic and trade growth in the last decades. The reduction of
economic activity in East and Southeast Asia in 1998 thus has important
consequences for the international economy. ane important effect is the reduction of
prices in international commodity markets following the diminishing Asian demand.
The net effect is, however, lImited for the countries analyzed since they all benefit
from the fall in the price of oiL.
aur conc1usion is that the turmoil in East and Southeast Asia is of relatively lIttle
importanee to the countries analyzed. Their economies are more exposed to polItical
instability, regional conflicts, weather conditions, and unsound macroeconomic
management than to the effects from Asia. However, the development in Asia prior to
the crisis, particularly with regard to the amount and utilIzation of incoming funds and
the managing of exchange rates, may be an important lesson for other developing
countries.
. The authors thank Stein Tønnesson for useful cornents and suggestions.
1 Introduction
This report analyzes the impact of the crises in Asia on six developing countries,
South Afrca, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, and Bangladesh. In order to
do so, we first distinguish between three crises: the currency crisis, the financial crisis,
and the economic crisis. The three crises are c10sely related, but it is not the case that
one crisis inevitably leads to the others. In South Africa, for example, the currency
crisis did not trigger a financial crisis.
The countres inc1uded in this study do not have close trade and investment lInks to
Asia, although Malaysia has recently become one of the most important sources of
foreign direct investment in South Afrca. Furhermore, with the exception of South
Afrca the countries are not integrated into the world financial markets. The curency
and financial crisis therefore has had little direct effect in these countries. The
economic crisis has, however, had an impact, albeit so far it has probably been small.
Only if the economic crisis eventually spreads to the OECD area, will it take a
significant toll on the poor countries inc1uded in the study.
On the international level the economic crisis is first and foremost felt in the world
commodity markets. In addition, aid flows from Japan have dec1ined as aresult of the
recession there, and aid flows from multilateral ageneies and Japan are to some extent
diverted to the crisis-ridden Asian economies. In late 1998 Japan launched a special
aid program for the countres most heavily affected by the crisis, and some of the
initial funds arranged by the International Monetar Fund (IMF) came from the
coffers of the World Ban and the Asian Development Bank.
The paper starts with an analysis of the crises in Asia. The origin of the currency
crisis and how it relates to the financial and economic crises are discussed in section
2. It is emphasized that the crisis is neither unique, nor is it the result of an exogenous
shock caused by international speculators, as is often claimed. Rather we posit that the
crisis had been in the making for some time and was partly due to bad policy. The
polIcy errors relate to what the govemments did, but even more to the. errors of
omission. In particular, gainfullIberalIzation of international capital flows requires a
well diversified and developed local financial sector which is capable of managing
risk, handle cash flows safe1y and allocate credit efficiently. It is argued that the
countries that had such a financial system in place and in addition managed aggregate
demand in order to avoid large, accumulated deficits on the current account escaped
the crisis with the 1east ruptures.
The downturn that the currency crisis triggered was more serious than a correction of
the built up imbalances called for. Section 3 maps out the channels through which
financial and economic crises spread from one country to another. In addition it
discusses the policy measures each country and multilateral institutions such as IMF
and the World Bank have at their disposal in order to prevent financial crises from
developing into economic crises and to limit the contagion effects. The impact on the
selected developing countries in Africa and Asia is discussed in more detail in section
4. Finally section 5 conc1udes by drawing some lessons from the Asian crisis for
development policy in the future.
2
2 The financial and economic crisis in Asia
The financial crisis goes back to the burst of Japan's bubble property market in the
beginning of this decade, while the Asian currency crisis is usually seen as dating
back to the collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime in Thailand on July 2 1997.
The effect of the Thai devaluation was, however, only "the straw which broke the
tigers' back". To get a full understanding of the financial and economic turmoil in the
region it is necessary to take into account the development in the preceding years.
For nigh on two decades, a group of countries in East and Southeast Asia had
sustained remarkably high rates of economic growth. Through a combination of high
savings and investment rates, human capital accumulation, export-promoting policies
and a governent-initiated focus on rap id industrialIzation, the countries
accomplished an impressive transformation of their economies. The countries are
usually classified in two groups - the first generation tigers which are Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, and the second generation tigers which are
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
2.1 The period preceding the crises
The financial crisis has been paricularly severe in four of these countries; Indonesia,
Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, although all the countries face lower 'economic
growth in 1998 as a result of the regional turmoil. There are some important
similarties between the countries which have been hardest hit by the financial crisis: l
~ Cheap international capital, facilitated by deregulation of national banking
systems and the growth of an increasingly integrated international financial sector
contributed to a bubble-like development of asset-, equity- and property prices.
~ International capital was partly attracted to the region by the high historical rates
of return, partly pushed from industrialized countries where interest Iates were
low. The fixed! managed exchange-rate regimes of the countries in Asia resulted
in a misconception of the actual exchange rate risks, and some of the foreign
creditors may have perceived the debt asguaranteed by the governent in the
various Asian countries.
~ Prior to the financial crisis, the asset-, equity- and property bubble burst, resulting
in an increase in non-performing loans and a sharp reduction in the value of the
collatera1 of 10ans extended by financial institutions. This development is on many
accounts similar to what happened in Japan and the Western world in the latter
part of the 1980s.
~ The crisis-ridden countries had opened the capital account on the balanee of
payment, but the 10cal financial system was not prepared to handle short-term
capital flows.
~ PolIcy makers were reluctant to see the fragilIty of their financial systems and the
need for a devaluation of their currencies in lIght of changing international
circumstances, and thus failed to make necessary polIcy corrections in the period
leading up to the crisis.
i A more comprehensive and coherent analysis of the background for the financial crisis, where the
development in the individual countries is presented in more detail, can be found in Tenold (1998:16-
41).
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A major problem in Thailand and Malaysia was the large current account deficits
financed by large inflows of capital in the period before the financial crisis. A
comparison of current account development in various countries in Asia reveals an
interesting feature. The countries that had sustained current account deficits in the
beginning of the 1990s are those countries which have been hit by the. financial
crisis.2
Tab1e 2.1 Curent account development; per cent of GDP. 3
2.2 Problems in the real economy
The negative financial development was exacerbated by real economic problems.
Exporting sectors suffered from overvalued currencies following the depreciation of
the Japanese yen towards the US dollar and European currencies. Since Japan was the
most important competitor to the Asian tigers and the tigers had a fixed exchange rate
towards the dollar, loss of competitiveness followed. Global overcapacity in important
sectors such as the semiconductor and car industries fuher constrained export
growth. Imports continued to grow unabated a10ng with growth in domestie demand,
and deteriorating trade balances resulted. .
Reduced export growth fuelled speculation that some of the "tigers" were
encountering strctural difficulties. The apparently vanishing competitive advantage
in the produetion of labor-intensive goods, particularly after the opening of the
Chinese economy, would in time force the countries to c1imb up another rung on the
industri al quality ladder. This transformation to exports of more advanced goods
necessitated large infrastrueture investments and a high degree of humçl. capital
formation. In South Korea's case, the trouble was not only fierce competition from
low-cost producers. The strong depreciation of the Japanese yen led to an
improvement in Japanese competitiveness as well, meaning that South Korean exports
were challenged on two fronts.
2 The current account deficits in Indonesia and South Korea were moderate, and can not alone explain
the crisis in these countries. The explanation lies partly in the way the current account deficit was
financed and weaknesses in the local financIal system which in turn constitute the interface between the
international and local financial markets. Additionally, the economic crisis in Indonesia is closely
intertined with the countr's political crisis. The problems in South Korea were amplified when
international investors took a more skeptie view of the debt situation of the countr's large industrial
conglomerates3 Figures from IMF (1997:142-143) and, in the case of Taiwan, from Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini
(1998:103). The shaded boxes highlight negative figures. Despite the fact that the countries most
severely hit by the financial crisis are the countries with the current account deficits, the size of the
deficit is seemigly umelated to the magnitude of the problems in the various countries
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Corrption and "crony capitalism" are of ten presented as one of the main causes of
the financial and economic turmoil in Asia. There is lIttle doubt that this aspect of the
economic organization has had an adverse effect on economic effciency and income
distribution. However, its role in the current turmoil tends to be overstated. There is
no indication that corrption and cronyism increased in the last years, and these
factors were apersistent feature of the political and economic regimes even when the
countries' growth rates were twice the international average. Rather, we find that what
triggered the financial and economic distress was the accumulation of foreign short-
term debt in the years preceding the financial crisis. Even though crony capitalIsm did
not trigger the crisis, it contributed to the misallocation of resources that accumulated
into structural problems. Furthermore, c10se ties between Thai polIticians and
businessmen made it possible to conceal the actual economic standing of several
businesses, in paricular financing companies with large non-performing portfolIos.
This may have delayed reforms and made the financial crisis more severe.
2.3 Debt and depreciation
Against a backdrop ofhigh economic growth and financial sector liberalIzation, banks
and other financial institutions in Asia increased their borrowing from foreign sources
dramatically. Governent-initiated changes made foreign lIquidity more easily
accessible, and the foreign funds were to a large extent lent to local companies and
individuals.
Figure 2.1 Bank and private sector foreign debt, billion dollars.4
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Accumulation of foreign debt is not necessarily a problem. If the inflow of foreign
capital is utilIzed in sectors which will bring future export eamings, the expected
revenue increase may be us ed to service the foreign debt. Such sustainable deficits
4 Based on figures depicting debt to BIS-reporting banks from Bank for International Settlenients (1996
& 1998b: Table 5A).
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characterized the development in several Asian countries until the beginning of the
1990s. However, from the beginning of the 1990s, it appears that the foreign capital to
a larger extent funded speculative investments in assets, equity and real estate, as well
as an increase in consumption. The reduction of the profitabilIty of investments is
illustrated by a sharp decrease in the inverse of the Incremental Capital/ Output Ratio
(ICOR) in South Korea and Thailand in the first five years of the 1990s, compared to
the last five years of the previous decade.
Table 2.2 Average ICOR (inverse).5
1986-1990 1991-1996
Indonesia 19,2 22,6
Malaysia 25,1 22,1
South Korea 32,9 20,2
Thailand 32,6 19,6
Three aspects of the high private debt were ofparticular importance, and are. crucial in
exp1aining the financial crisis and the subsequent economic problems:
~ The share of non-performing loans (NL) increased markedly in the wake of the
collapse of the asset and real estate bubbles. In the summer of 1998 NPLs
constituted as much as 70 per cent of totalloans of some Thai banks. Even though
this is an extreme example, the share of NPLs increased in the other tiger
economies as well. In June 1998, estimates sugge st that NPLs constitute 50 per
cent of total lo ans in Indonesia, 30 per cent in South Korea and Thailand, and 25
per cent in Malaysia. 
6
~ The loans had not been secured against changes in the exchange rate. This is only
a potential problem when the exchange rate is fixed relative to the currency in
which the debt is denominated. However, if the national currency depreciates, the
amount of local currency ne ed ed to pay the creditor increases, thus increasing the
debt burden and the possibility of default.
~ There was a lack of correspondence between the bans' and finanee companies'
borrowing and lending. They had typically borrowed short-term money abroad,
and lent it to the private sector on a long-term basis. When debtors started to
default, the situation became serious relative1y quickly.
5 Figures from Bank for International Settlements (1998a:35). The figures depict the inverse ofICOR,
vIz the growth of GDP divided by investrent/GDP. A reduction implies that the economic growth
associated with a given leve! of investrents is reduced. The inverse of ICOR may thus qe used as a
proxy for the profitability of investrents.6 It is, however, important to ernphasize that the share of non-perforrng loans has increased as the
financial crisis has evolved; figures from July 1997 wil therefore be notably lower.
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Figure 2.2 Short-term debt relative to reserves and total debt.7
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The problems in the financial sector and the real economy led to a loss of confidenee
in future growth in several Asian countries, and as a result of this, their ability to
defend the value of their exchange rates was questioned as well. Agents expecting a
depreciation reacted by selling the currency, thus creating a currency supply increase
which necessitated offcial intervention to keep the exchange rate at the pegged value.
Thailand was the first country which fell victim to large curency sales following
fears about depreciation. Joint intervention from the central banks of Thailand and
Singapore was necessary to counter a speculative attack in the spring of 1997.
However, this and subsequent interventions led to a strong fall in Thai reserves,
making the authorities' decision to support the value of the baht even less credible. In
the end the amount of foreign exchange reserves was insufficient to counter the
speculation, culminating with the end of the Thai fixed exchange rate regime.
The disbanding of the Thai currency peg in July 1997 resulted in an immediate fall in
the value of the baht. This had far-reaching implications, as the financial crisis and the
currency crisis embodied self-reinforcing effects. When the value of the baht was
reduced, the foreign currency nominated debt outstanding increased in terms of local
currency. An increase in non-performing loans followed the increased debt burden in
private companies. This escalation of the problems in the financial sector led to
repercussions on the currency market where increased skepticism about the future
development in Thailand triggered further downward pressure on the exchange rate.
The Thai authorities were faced with a difficult decision in this period. Whatever they
did, there was a danger that the crisis in the financial sector would escalate. They
could raise local interest rates and hope that this would counter the currency outfow.
The flp side of this was the risk that the share of non-performing loans denominated
in local curency would increase. The authorities cou1d alternatively lower interest
rates in order to ease the position of the banks and finanee companies and at the same
7 Figures for short-term debt relative to reserves from BIS (1998a:128) and for share oftot~l debt from
(1998b). Figures for reserves do not take into account any forward contraets entered into by the central
banks. In Thailand, potentiallosses on forward contraets implied that the real reserves were far smaller
than offcIal reserves in mid-97; some sources have suggested a "worst-case" figure of 5 bilion dollar,
as opposed to the offcial figure of27,5 bilion dollar.
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time stimulate demand. The flip side of this strategy was that the currency outfow
could intensify, the exchange rate could further deteriorate and the share of non-
performing foreign currency denominated loans would increase. The Thai authorities
vacilated between these strategi es, and only when the IMF had been called to the
scene, and demanded heavy interest rates increases as a condition for giving financial
help, did the Thai governent follow a consistent strategy.8
3 The contagion effect - can it be prevented?
The financial- and currency-problems in Asia in 1997 are on no account unique.
Before the turmoil in Asia, the 1990s had already witnessed two major international
currency-crises - the European Monetary System-crisis in the beginning of the decade
and the peso-crisis, which spread from Mexico to large parts of Latin America in the
middle of the decade. However, in terms of magnitude, depth and extent ofcontagion
the Asian crises are far more dramatie than the other two.
3.1 Regional and international contagion
The change in investors' sentiment in the wake of the peso-crisis, which led to the
diffusion of Mexico's problems to other Latin American countries, has been dubbed
the tequila-effect. Likewise, the financial and currency problems spiead from
Thailand to the other countries in the region. The aptly-named tom-yum-effect,
worked through a v ari et y of channeis, both real and psychological.9
There are direct economic reasons for the pressure on other Asian currencies in the
wake of the collapse of the Thai fixed exchange rate regime. A depreciated Thai
currency implIed an increase in the country's competitiveness, and as several of the
countries in East and Southeast Asia compete in the same international markets, this
was expected to have an advers e effect on the other countries in the region. In
addition to this, the relatively high, and increasing, share of intraregional trade meant
that these countries would be adversely affected by the reduced growth of the Thai
economy. Probably more important than the trade aspect, however, were the other
strong economic and financial linkages among the countries of East and Southeast
Asia. The industrialized Asian countries had a disproportionately large share of their
investments in other countries in the region, inc1uding Thailand. They would therefore
be relatively harder hit by the financial- and currency crisis in Thailand than countries
outside the region. Just like capital from Asian countries had been important in
creating the stock market and property bubbles, the owners of this capital would be
adversely affected by the fall in asset- and currency values.
The troubles were also spread as a result of changes in market sentiment. The fact that
the fast-growing Thai economy had prove d to have such large hidden defects came as
a surprise, and the other countries in the region were subject to c10ser scrutiny. This
revealed that several of the other "tigers" might also have unsustainable current
8 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank stil do not agree whether this was the correct
response to the problems. World Bank economists, and others who have been skeptical of the IMF's
intervention, have claired that the high interest rates exacerbated the financial problems and resulted
in an unecessarily deep depression.
9 This contagion is analyzed in more detail in Tenold (1998:34-40).
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account deficits, overvalued curencies and dec1ining profitability of investments.
Consequently, international investors feared other instances of financial and currency
crisis in the region. 
lo
This negative attitude was reinforced by a change in the surveilanee polIcies of
international investors and rating ageneies. Their attention changed from
macroeconomic to microeconomic determinants (Wade 1998:12-13). Whereas their
focus had previously been on macroeconomic indicators such as debt relative to GDP,
export growth, inflation and budget deficits, in which the countries in the region
largely came out positive, investors and rating ageneies now started to focus on
microeconomic indicators and the composition of external debt. Their view of the
situation in the Asian countries was far more negative when factors such as the
volume of short-term private debt relative to reserves, the curency composition of
debt, and the private sectors debt/ equity-ratio were us ed as basis for evaluation. This
led to a major loss of confidence, and a change in the international investors'
sentiments towards the countries in East and Southeast Asia.
The contagion and the effects of the changes in market sentiments were amplIfied by
some specific features of the international financial markets. Two such
"psychological" aspects were ofparticular importance. On the one hand, there was the
problem of self-fulfillng prophecies. As previous1y mentioned, when the agents in the
financial market expected a Thai devaluation, and acted in a manner consistent with
their expectations, the Central Ban had to intervene by sellng foreign exchange,
leading to an exhaustion of Thai reserves up to the point where a depreciation was
inevitable. Thus, by expecting a breaking up of the fixed exchange-rate regimes, the
agents in the international financIal market managed to provoke exactly that
response.11 In addition, the exchange rate and stock market plunge exhibited a
tendency of "overshooting. " The fall in the value of currencies and sto eks was larger
than what was warranted by the general circumstances. One reason for this is that the
actions of international investors can be explained by what economists call the fire-
sale effect. When a shop burns, the owner is willng to sell his stock at low prices to
get rid of it before the flames get it. Likewise, as investors were expecting a strong
reduction ofvalues, the fear ofbeing "the last one out" led to overreaction. A result of
this herd behavior is that actions which are individually rational have consequences
which make them collectively irrational.
The contagion of the crisis. may thus be explained both by economic theories and by
psychological mechanisms. The turoil spre ad fast. As early as three weeks after the
Thai authorities had been forced to give up the peg, The PhilIppines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore had been forced to change their exchange rate policies. The
downward pressure on the currencies of the PhilIppines, Malaysia and Indonesia can
be explained by the fact that these tended to be lumped in the "Newly Industrializing
Countr"-bracket together with Thailand, and there had been a high ~egree of
10 In some instances, e.g. in the case of South Korea, the problem was not necessarily "hidden defects".
Rather, well-known factors, such as the conglomerates' high ratio of debt to equity, were suddenly
viewed in a more negative manner.
11 It should, however, be ernphasized that there was good reason to expect that the fixed exchange rate
would collapse. Otherwise speculation would not have taken this dimension, and the probability that it
would succeed would have been much less. We can thus say that speculators brought about an overdue
correction of the exchange, in spite of govemments ' reluctance to do this.
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correlation in stock market fluctuations in these countries even before the crisis.
Singapore's decision to go from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating currency
can be seen as an attempt to avoid having to use reserves to defend the value of the
currency in light of expected speculation.
Asecond wave of contagion-induced speculation took place in October, when the
monetary authorities of Hong Kong had to increase the discount rate to some three
hundred per cent to counter the attack on the currency. The value of other Asian
currencies continued to fall, but the situation became increasingly more grave in the
beginning of December, when South Korea became the focus of attention. Fear about
the short-term debts of South Korean companies resulted in an 80 per cent fall in the
won/ dollar rate durng a three week period. The re as on for the plummeting currency
was partly the regional crisis, partly specific national circumstances. The most serious
problem was the extent of leverage in the huge chaebols. At the same time, a
combination of political and economic factors caused a crash in the value of the
rupiah, the Indonesian currency.12 In January 1998 the Indonesian rupiah was traded
at more than 17000 per dollar; an enormous decrease compared to the steady level of
approximately 2300 which had been attained for several years, or the 3500 rupiah per
dollar which had been recorded as late as October 1997.
As the financial crisis in Asia escalated, consequences were felt even outside the
region. One effect of the financial problems of the newly industrialized countries in
Asia, was increased skepticism to "emerging market economies" in general, mainly
based on the fact that these countries frequently have underdeveloped financial
sectors. Whereas the risk premium on emerging market debt had been reduced in
previous years, the spreads on international bonds widened considerably in the latter
par of 1997 (BIS 1998a:125). In June 1997 the average spre ad was 130 basis points,
but this had increased to 375 basis points six months later.l3 The increase in risk
premium was higher for Asian countries than for countries in Latin America,
reflecting the loss of confidenee in Asian development and ilustrating Asian
countries' problems of acquiring international financial resources.
In the first half of 1998 conditions in the international securities market had stabilized,
but in late summer there was a deterioration of investor confidenee following the
financial problems in Russia and Latin America, and the diffculties of a large
American hedge- fund. The main results of the loss of confidenee were increased
volatility, an enormous increase in the yie1d of emerging market securities and a
market in which only the most highly rated agents were able to attraet resources.14
12 In the earlypart of the autumn the Indonesian authorities had been praised for the policies which they
had introduced to tackle the crisis. However a major loss of confidenee in both the governent and the
rupiah in the last part of 1997 and the begining of 1998, amid fears of civil war and national debt
default, can explain why Indonesia has becorne the hardest hit countr. Additionally, the flght of
"ethnic Chinese capital" was probably of great importance, but it is difficult to get reliable statistics
which can confir this proposition.
13 For comparison the difference between Norwegian and German interest rate in early December 1998
was 425 basis points.
14 Emerging markets issuances declined by more than 50 per cent, and the spread on some bonds, eg
dollar-denomiated Russian bonds, increased to more than 6000 points, an all-time-high for an
emerging market instrent. Asian, and particularly Latin American bonds, were subject to a
multiplication of spreads as well, and the average spre ad on emerging market papers reached the same
leve! as that recorded at the height of the Mexican peso-crisis.
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This flght to qualIty can be seen as a result of international investors: changed
perception of the risk inherent in emerging market bonds, and a wish to reduce the
portfolio risk which had increased following the turmoil in Asia. Even though the
problems of Eastern European and Latin American countries had a very important
national dimension, there is lIttle doubt that the outcome has been amplIfied by the
negative experiences in Asia.
3.2 From financial crisis to economic crisis
The financial and currency crises have had dire consequences for economic activity,
particu1arly in the countries which have been hardest hit by depreciation and financial
sector problems. Whereas economic growth in Thailand and South Korea was among
the highest in the world during the period 1990-1996, it is expected that these
economies wil contract some 7 to 8 per cent in 1998. Perspectives are looking even
bleaker for Indonesia where contraction was ruing at 14 percent in the 4th quarter of
1998. Malaysia, which has chosen to manage without technical and' financial
assistanee from the IMF and in September 1998 introduced exchange controis, has not
fared any better than its neighbors. Output contracted by 8.6 percent in the third
quarter of 1998 compared to the same quarter the year before.15
Figure 3.1. Anual economic growth, 1985-1999.16
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The financial and currency situation influences the economic activity in a yariety of
ways. The fall in the value of the local currencies, together with plummeting asset and
property values, has resulted in astrong reduction of real income and wealth in East
and Southeast Asia. An important effect of this is that consumption and investments
have been reduced, which again has hampered aggregate demand and economic
activity. This reduction has been exacerbated by a strong outflow of foreign capital.
15 Source of these figures is The EconomIst 13.-19. February 1999, which reports the most recent
offcial statistics.16 Foreeasts are average estImates based on mid-1998 data from the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and Goldman Sachs. Compared to the most recent figures, the foreeasts seem to be on
the optistic side for Indonesia and Malaysia and perhaps on the pessimstie side for Thailand.
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Whereas the net private capital inflow to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, South
Korea and Thailand amounted to 93 bilion dollars in 1996, the corresponding figure
for 1997 was an outfow of some twelve billion dollars. This amounts to a change in
net capital inflow of 105 billon dollars, or ten per cent of GDP in the countries
affected. This enormous reversal of lIquidity has been made all the more serious by
the fact that the outfow was concentrated in the latter part of 1997.
Investments may have been further dampened by the interest rate increaseswhich the
IMF set as a condition for giving financial assistance. However, short term interest
rates have come down to between 6 and 7 percent in South Korea and Malaysia and
slIghtly below 6 percent in Thailand, and are not the major cause of low investment
rates any more, except in Indonesia where interest rates are still very high. Bleak
market growth prospects have made companies reluctant to invest, and the reduction
of liquidity has made some companies, though wiling, unable to invest.
Under normal circumstances, a fall in the value of a country's currency boosts
competitiveness and exports. However, in several Asian countries the contraction of
liquidity was so severe that it was impossible to get export credits and other kinds of
working capital even for companies without financial problems. Thus, the depressed
situation in the financial sector contributed to a transmission of the problems to well-
managed companies, and the potential for increased exports could not be realIzed due
to the constrained liquidity of the financial sector.17 Despite the fact that exports did
not increase as expected, the countries are now running curent account surpluses due
to a dramatie reduction of imports.
3.3 Limiting contagion and avoiding financial crises
The financial and currency crises in Asia, and their effects on other emerging markets,
have led to increased focus on what has come to be called "the international financial
architecture," a term attributed to the US Treasur Secretary Robert Rubin. One
aspect which has received particular attention is the question of short-term capital
flows and capital control. Advocates of capital control c1aim that the strong capital
outfow and subsequent contagion could have been avoided by the introduction of
simple capital control measures. Others disapprove and c1aim that the short-term
benefits of capital controis, including increased stability, wil be outweighed by long-
term deficiencies, including higher borrowing rates, administrative diffculties and
costs, delayed restructuring, and competitive distortions.
It is probably the case that once confidenee in an economy is gone, capital controls
can do lIttle to stem the outflow of capital. Nevertheless, free flows of capital on
capital account transactions require a sound and diversified local financial sector, and
the capacity to enforce regulations in accordance with international standards such as
the recommendations of the Basle Committee. In the absenee of such a system, free
flow of capital can increase volatilIty and do a lot of harm. Therefore, financial sector
reform and strengthening of the regulatory framework need to go hand in hand with
lIberalIzation of international capital flows. This is also reflected in the prominent role
17 Another reason for the lack of export growth was the fact that several countries competing in the
same international markets had theIr competitiveness improved by currency depreciation at roughly the
same time, sterilizing some of the effects of their depreciation.
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of the financial sector in the programs which were established in Asia in cooperation
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such programs are more directed
towards preventing similar crisis to occur in future, than to alleviate the present crisis
and limit contagion. Nevertheless, the reforms may also contribute to the restoration
of confidenee in the present situation, which indeed is an important step towards
stabilizing the situation.
In these crisis-ridden countries there is little doubt that deregulation, lIttle experience
with the mechanisms of the international capital market, and erroneous perceptions of
exchange rate risk contributed to the crisis and the contagion effect. After extensive
financial sector diffculties and heavy currency depreciation, Indonesia, Thailand, and
South Korea approached the IMF in order to arrange measures which could alleviate
the crises and help the countries regain investor confidence. The assistance from the
IMF was two- fold. On the one hand the countres were given financial assistance; the
IMF brokered rescue packages, consisting of capital from multilateral organizations
and other countries. The packages to Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea have a
combined va1ue of more than 100 bilion dollar. The technical assistance has met with
some resistance, particularly in Indonesia and South Korea, but all three countries are
now implementing the programs which have been designed in cooperation with the
IMF. The greater wilingness to implement these programs is a result of political
changes at the national leve1, as well as greater flexibility on IMF's part. The
programs were initially heavily criticized particularly for their failure to recognize the
depth of the economic crisis and its social consequences. They were therefore
modified and the austerity measures were relaxed somewhat.
Moms Goldstein (1998), of the American "think-tank" Institute for International
Economics, has suggested five issues which should be emphasized in connection with
reforms aimed at alleviating the shortcomings of the international financial system:
~ Reducing moral hazard and making private debt reschedulIng more orderly and
more flexible;
~ Strengthening prudential standards in developing countries and making it more
attractive for countries to implement these standards sooner;
~ Improving transparency and disc10sure in financial markets;
~ Giving IMF surveilanee more punch;
~ Shoring up risk management in global financial institutions.
These changes wil not constitute a fundamental reform of the international financial
system, but can be seen as a way of increasing transparency and reducing risks
without changing the system. More radical commentators have suggested the
introduction of a tax on capital transactions, often called a Tobin-tax, as a means of
increasing the stability of international financial markets, or introduction of other
types of controlon short-term transactions.
3.4 Political implications
The financia1 and economic turmoil in East and South east Asia has resulted in
political changes in all the countries affected by the crises. A good analysis of the
political economy and political implications of the turmoil is given in Tønnesson
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(1998). However, it may be fritful to give a brief introduction to the polItical
development in the countries most adversely affected by the crises:
~ Thailand was not only the first country to be hit by the financial crisis, it was also
the first country where there was major political change. In the autumn of 1997
General ChavalIt was forced to resign, and his governent, by many viewed as
corrpt and responsible for the current problems, was replaced by a coalition
governent led by Chuan Leekpai. This governent has subsequently proved to
be extremely willing to conform to the demands of the IMF. However, in the
autumn of 1998 laeking support in the parliament forced the governent to
postpone some basic legislation, including a new bankptcy law which would
have facilItated the restructuring of the economy.
~ In South Korea a former dissident, Kim Dae-Jung, won the presidential election
rather surrisingly, partly because the voters preferred a leader who could not be
linked to the adverse development.
~ In Indonesia the polItical and economic development can not be separated in an
analytical context. The loss of confidenee which the country fell victim to was
based as much on political and ethnic as economic factors. It remains to be seen
whether the apparent "shift of power" from former President Suharto to the
current President Habibie, one of his proteges, is anything more than window
dressing.
~ The situation in Malaysia is also difficult to assess, as the Umno are still in power,
as they have been since the 1950s. However, the crown-prince of the party, former
deputy prime minister and finanee minister Anwar Ibrahim, was ousted from the
governent in early September 1998 and later arrested. Despite the complexity of
this case, which currently lingers in the Malaysian judiciary, there is lIttle doubt
about the fact that there were serious polIcy differences between Mr. Anwar
Ibrahim and the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad, in the period leading up to
the exc1usion. The crisis has led to a strengthened position for two established
opposition parti es.
It is diffcult to foresee the long term impact of these political changes, partly because
it is not yet c1ear whether several of the changes are real reforms, or whether they are
"window dressing" designed to silenee an increasingly vocal opposition. Tønnesson
(1998) notes that crises are often followed by reforms, but that insuffciei:t reforms
may lead to new crises. He emphasizes the fact that the crises, in a regional securty
perspective, have led to a shift of power from the non-Chinese to the Chinese states
and an affrmation of the United States, power in economic questions.
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4 The effect of the crises on selected development partners
The countries inc1uded in this study, South Afrca, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia,
U ganda and Bangladesh are no strangers to crises. Mozambique, Tanzania and
Zambia have had more or less permanent balanee of payment problems since the
1980s. Economic development in these countries is held back by local bottleneeks
such as weak institutions and lack of infrastrueture. Furthermore, the share of rain-
fed agrculture in GDP is so large that variations in income over time large1y reflects
variations in weather conditions. These countries have simply not entered a stage of
development characterized by sustained economic growth. In fact, GDP per capita is
about the same now as it was in the 1960s, and transactions with outside markets are
largely confined to trade in basic goods, aid transfers and remittances from workers
abroad. Furthermore, the financial sector is in such a state that the market for long-
term credit is all but non-existent. In such a situation the consumption and produetion
decisions can of ten not be separated, and investment for future capacity extensions is
fuded from retained profits.
Our analysis shows that economic and socIal development in Mozambique, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia are determined by 10cal conditions and aid flows whi1ethe Asian
crisis has only a marginal impact. To ilustrate the point, the Budget Speech made by
the Minister of State Presidents Offce in Tanzania in June 1998 mentioned weather
conditions in most sections of the speech, while the Asian crisis was not mentioned
with one single word. Mozambique is in the midst of a strong, donor-supported
recovery after decades of war. Its development is fragile and dependent on aid and
good relations to South Afrca for stil many years to come. Bangladesh does not
have strong trade lInkages to South East Asia in spite of its location. N~ither is it
integrated into international financial markets. South Afrca is about to reenter the
global economy and is the only country in this sample that is significantly affected by
the currency crisis in Asia. In addition the development in South Afrca has an impact
on its SADC partners and perhaps to a marginal extent also on Uganda. 
18 Therefore,
the impact of the Asian crisis on South Afrca is discussed at some more length than
the other countres.
Westart the ana1ysis by looking at each of the three types of crises, the. channels
through which they might affect the countries in our study, and rough estimates of the
magnitude of the impact. It is shown that the direct impact is smalL. We then go on to
look at each countr in more detail in order to explain why the impact is relatively
smalL. 19
4.1 The currency and financial crises
With the exception of South Afrca, the countries in this study receive very little
inflows of private portfolio investments, or private, foreign loans. By the end of
1996, the six countries' combined external debt to private creditors was about 18
percent of Thailand' s debt, and of this, South Afrca accounted for more than 90
percent (BIS 1998). Moreover, out of the six countries in the sample, only South
18 SADC is the Southem Africa Development Community, a regional trade block which aspires to
become a common market, but has a long way to go before that becomes areality.
19 There appears to be some symetr in the situation in the sense that unprecedented growth in the
East Asian countries did not spil over to the least developed countries in Africa and neither did the
fmancial and economIc crises.
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Afrca has a currency that is convertible on international markets. Therefore, the
exchange rate of the currencies of these countries are determined by local demand for
and supply of foreign exchange. These are in turn mainly determined by trade and aid
flows, and to some extent other transfers such as remittances from workers abroad.
Financial turmoil far afield has little impact on this market. As expected, none of the
countries in question has had a curency crisis anywhere near the Thai baht crisis,
which in turn is the mildest of the currency crises in the four countries discussed in
section 2. Figure 4.1 depicts the exchange rate indices for the six countries compared
to Thailand, and 1996 is chosen as the base year.
Figure 4.1 Exchange rate indices
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The financial crisis in Asia has led to higher risk premiums and consequently higher
interest rates in emerging economies. High interest rates discourage outfows of
footloose capital, but also dampens investment and economic growth. However, in
the countries inc1uded in this study, there is lIttle footloose capital ready to flee as
confidenee in emerging markets dec1ine. Even in South Afrca, foreign portfolIo
investment has been moderate and capital control has prevented large amounts of
local savings from fleeing the country. Nevertheless, the South Afrcan reserve ban
had to raise the discount rate sharp ly from 15 percent in April 1998 to 18 percent in
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May and further to 20 percent in June 1998.20 The other countries inc1uded in this
study mostly borrow internationally on IDA terms, and neither local nor external
interest rates are affected by the turoil in international financial markets.
A possible effect in the medium term of the financial turmoil in Asia is a reduction of
funds from multilateral donor ageneies such as the IMF and the World Ban. Since
the total amount of development aid is lImited, an increase in multilateral aid flows to
crisis-ridden Asian and Latin American countres reduces funds available to other
areas. It is, however, doubtful that this wil hurt the least developed countries. In the
longer fU, if the Asian crisis leads to a more cautious attitude to emerging markets,
the poor developing countries' access to global financial markets may be delayed.
4.2 The economic crisis
The economic crisis can be traced in all the countries inc1uded in the study, albeIt to a
different extent. The most important channels for the spreading of the crisis are trade,
inc1uding changing terms of trade, aid, and remittances from workers abroad. Table
4.1 presents key figures that ilustrate the linkages of the countries in our study to the
Asian economies and exposure to the world markets.
Table 4.1 Basic indicators
South Africa Mozambiaue Tanzania Zambia U ganda Bangladesh
Growt 1990-97 1. 6.9 2.9 -0.5 7.2 4.5
Growt 97 1.7 7.9 3.3 3.5 5.2 5.9
Interest rate 16 Na 16.2 17.7 14 8
Current -1.5 -29 -7.9 -6 -4 -3.1
account/GDP
Exports/GDP 28 26 22 30 11 16
Ow to Asia 12 11 28 30 3 8
Imports/GDP 26.8 70 33 21 26 24
Ow oil 9 11 16 13 7 6
Net current -143 283 317.5 Na 620 1909
transfers
Development aid 361 (0.3) 923 (72) 894 (30) 614 (19) 684 (12) 1255 (4.5)
F oreign debt 23 389 5781 (443) 6380 Na 3564 16569 (63)
(100) (64)
Long-term 14284 5299 Na Na 3054 15713
Short-term 9105 281 Na na 93 186
Gross reserves 6000 517 622 239 633 1609
F oreign direct 1705 35 250 70 250 145
investrent
Growth is given as percentage change over the previous year. The interest rate is the nominal discount
rate. Current account, exports and imports are given as percentages of GDP, current transfers in
milions of dollars, development aid (ODA) as mil. USD and percentage of GDP in brackets, foreign
debt, reserves and FDl are given in millons of USD (percentage of GDP in brackets). Figures are
from 1995 on development aid, otherwisefrom 1996 or 1997.
Sources; lMF, World Bank, ElU, Bank of Tanzania, South African Reserve Bank
20 This revers ed the gradualloosening of monetary policy which had been implemented from the fourth
quarter of 1997. Tight rnonetary policy was introduced in order to defend the exchange rate of the rand
during the curency crisis in 1996.
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Note Mozambique's precarious external position. The current account deficit is
funded by development aid, and to some extent foreign investment, mainly from
South Afrca. Note also that in spite of its location, Bangladeshi exports to Asia are
relatively small.
4.2.1 Trade and terms of trade
Starting with trade, there is a direct impact of the economic crisis in Asia stemming
from lower demand for industri al raw materials in the crisis-ridden countries and
improved competitiveness of Asian exports due to currency devaluation. Obviously,
the countries with the c10sest trade lInks with Asia and the countries that compete
directly with Asian goods in the world market, or in their own home markets are those
most affected. In our sample Zambia, Tanzania and South Afrca have the largest
share of their exports going to Asia. Their major exports are agricultural raw
materials, metals and minerals. South Afrca and Bangladesh are the only countries in
the sample with an industri al sector that competes directly with Asian goods in their
own home market and in the most important export markets which are the SADC
region for South Afrca and the OECD markets for Bangladesh.
In spite of the sharp decline in the exchange rate of the crisis-stricken Asian
economies, they have apparently not been able to exploit the improvement in
competitiveness. Exports increased by only 9 percent in dollar terms in South Korea
and 1 percent in Indonesia between the first quarers of 1997 and 1998 (IMF 1998),
while exports dec1ined in dollar terms to the tune of2.5 percent in Thailand during the
same period of time. For comparson, Mexican exports increased by 24 percent from
1994 to 1995 following the Mexican currency crisis. This difference in adjustment to
the currency crisis has at least three reasons. First, the import content of Asian
exports is high so that the improvement in competitiveness is small er than the
depreciation of the exchange rates suggests. Second, a potential increase in 'exports is
constrained by a liquidity squeeze or credit cruch. Third, while Mexico's major
export market was a booming US economy in 1994, the major export market of the
Asian countries is a depressed Japan. Therefore, the major impact of the Asian crisis
on international trade as yet is the dec1ine in imports to Asia.
When the credit crunch eventually eases in Asia, Bangladesh and South Africa are the
countries among those inc1uded in this study which are most affected by. increased
competition. Bangladesh will face increased competition in the world market for its
textile exports, while South Afrca wil face increased competition in its own home
market and the SADC region. Both South Afrca and the SADC as a whole are in a
proeess of scalIng down import protection. The trade liberalization policy was
designed to allow for gradual adjustment to increased competition. However, a
combination of the shar depreciation of the Asian currencies towards the US dollar
and the South Afrcan policy of defending the exchange rate of the rand towards the
dollar could lead to "shock therapy" for local industries rather than the gradual
approach envisaged a few years ago.z1
A rough estimate of the direct impact of a slowdown in import demand in Asia for the
six countres is shown in table 4.2. The figures inc1ude all Asia, and between the
21 Even the gradual approach envisaged by the governent led to massive protests both from the
business community and the trade unions in South Africa.
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second quarter of 1997 and the second quarter of 1998, imports to Asia dec1ined by
about 15 percent in dollar terms.22 Another effect of the crisis in Asia is a change in
terms of trade, Since the countries in our study's main exports are commodities, they
are largely affected by changes in commodity prices. The world mark et commodity
prices have declined by about 20 percent in dollar terms on average from November
1997 to November 1998. This average conceals large differences among
commodities. Coffee, for example, has seen a smaller dec1ine than average, and
coffee is the most important exports of Tanzania and Uganda. Oil, on the other hand,
has seen a year on year drop in world market prices of 43 percent. How much of the
changes in commodity prices can be attributed to the Asian crisis is diffcult to say.
1998 has seen extreme weather conditions, increased supply of oil, and an escalating
economic crisis in Russia, which also have contributed. Besides, the declining trend
starte d in 1996, before the Asian crisis. It is therefore beyond the scope of this study
to come up with precise numbers on the linkage between terms of trade, the Asian
economic crisis and income in the six countries included in our study. All the
countries in our study are net importers of oiL. Estimates of the savings due to lower
oil prices and the direct effect of a dec1ine in import demand in Asia are given in table
4.2. The figures are given as percentages of GDP.
Table 4.2 Impact on GDP ofreduced export demand in Asia and lower oil prices
South Africa Mozambique Tanzania Zambia U ganda Bangladesh
Exports - 0.5 - 0.4 - 0.9 - 1.4 -0.05 -0.2
Oil 1.0 3.3 2.3 1.2 0.8 0.6
The table indicates that the drop in import demand in Asia shaves half of a percentage
point off GDP in South Africa, while the dec1ine in oil prices saves South Afrca one
percentage point of GDP in imports of oiL. The full impact of changing terms of trade
and indirect effects due to changes in import demand in the rest of the world are not
taken into account here. Nevertheless, table 4.2 suggests that the net impact of the
economic crisis in Asia on the countries inc1uded in the table is smalL. In
Mozambique, the gain from lower oil prices are so much higher than the loss of
export revenue due to lower import demand in Asia, that the net effect is probably
positive. For the other countries in the sample, the gain from lower oil prices is
probably not sufficient to counterbalance lower import demand (inc1uded in the table)
and deteriorating terms oftrade (not inc1uded in the table), and the net effect is likely
to be negative. Zambia appears to be the countr most adversely affected through the
trade chanel.
Asecond round of more indirect trade-effects of the Asian economic crisis on poor
countries could occur if lower demand in Asia takes its toll on OECD exporting
industries. An indication of this happening came when Boeing, the largest
manufacturer of airplanes in the world announced layoffs of workers due to the Asian
crisis. The fact that individual export-oriented companies have to scale back
production does not necessarily affect total demand in the OECD significantly,
however. In fact, OECD growth appears to have been lItte affected by the Asian
crisis. An expected downturn in the US economy is more related to normal business
22 Reliable figures for each individual Asian countr are not available. EstImates of the direct irnpact
of the Asian crisis through the trade channeI are made by the authors based on figures in table 4.1.
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cyc1e fluctuations and a stock market bubble that might burst, than to the Asian crisis.
Nevertheless, a cyclIcal downturn in the US on top of the Asian crisis may increase
the probabilIty that the economic problems in Latin America, particularly Brazil, turn
into a serious crisis and then affects poor developing countries through the trade
channel. 23
4.2.2 Foreign investment
The downturn in commodity prices and loss of confidenee in emerging markets
coincided with lIberalIzation of investment policy and privatization in countries such
as Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda. The expected inflow of foreign investment to these
countries following lIberalIzation may be postponed due to the Asian crisis. On the
other hand, if depressed prices are perceived to be temporary, commodity-based
companies that are listed on the stock exchange have become a bargain for foreign
investors. Allowing foreign acquisitions of commodity-based companies under such
circumstances may create political problems for the liberalization proeess.
Low commodity prices have led to restrcturing in multinational commodity-based
firms. There is at present a wave of mergers and acquisitions, pariculady in the
petroleum sector. In such a situation it may be difficult for smaller, national,
independent commodity-based companies to survive. Two of the major commodity-
based companies in South Afrca have adjusted to this reality by moving the primar
lIsting to the London Stock Exchange (Gencor and Anglo American).24 Both the
South African multinationals are big enough to enter the FTSE 100. They now have
to follow FTSE accounting and disc10sure standards which in turn reduce the risk
premium on the capital they raise in OECD credit markets. The London 1I.sting thus
facilitates the companies' further expansion in the world markets while focusing on
their core businesses.
The exodus of South Afrcan multinationals had probably taken place even without
the Asian crisis, and should be seen as par of the ongoing globalIzation proeess. The
companies may by this move become vehic1es for international capital flows, the
transfer of technology, and integration into the world markets that will benefit South
Afrca in the long run. This is indeed the way South African authorities see it, and
they did not oppose Gencor and Anglo American's move.
We have now seen that the Asian currency and financial crisis has had no discernible
impact on Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and Bangladesh, while it has
contributed to higher interest rates and slower economic growth in South Afrca. The
economic crisis in Asia, on the other hand, has had a negative impact on exports in all
the countries concerned. The economic crisis has also contributed to changes in terms
of trade, but whether positive or negative for each individual country remains to be
seen. For Mozambique, the net impact of the economic crisis in Asia may well be
23 Brazil recently accepted a rescue package from the IMF in order to prevent furter capital outflows
and a devaluation of the curency. This package only postponed the currency crisis which materialized
in mid January 1999. Economic growth slowed down to -0.1 percent in the third quarter of 1998,
while industrial production declined by 6 percent in September compared to September 1997. BrazIl is
at the moment in recession and has to take bold measures in order to shore up its public finances.24 Gencor was split up and a new company, Billiton, was formed from previous divisions of Gencor
and listed in London. Anglo American, the largest company in South Africa, is currently ir the proeess
of listing in London. In addition South African Breweries, one of the largest breweries in the world,
has liste d in London, and Old Mutual, an insurance company, plan to do the same.
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positive, whi1e for the other countres in the sample, the impact is probably slightly
negative. The next section takes a c10ser look at each country in the sample and
analyzes the fundamentals that determine to what extent the countries are influenced
by turoil in the world economy.
4.3 Fundamentals in individual countries
4.3. 1 South Africa
South Afrca has had a sound and relatively sophisticated financial system for
decades. The Reserve Bank (the countr's central bank) was established in 1921 and
has a relatively high autonomy in ruing the monetary polIcy of the country. Its
major policy objective is to protect the value of the South Afrcan currency; e.g. an
exchange rate target. Nevertheless, South Afrca has a floating exchange rate, and the
Reserve Bank's major task is to avoid short-term volatility (Stals 1998). South
Afrca's bank regulation and supervision are based entirely on the recommendations
of the Basle Committee (Stals 1998).
In the context of the Asian crisis, the financial sector's level of development
constitutes a very important difference between South Afrca and Asia. The Asian
tigers started out on their unprecedented growth path with a weak financial sector and
regulatory framework. Furthermore the financial sector, its regulatory framework and
the institutions that were supposed to enforce regulations were not significantly
improved durng the period of rapid growth. In contrast, South Afrca was founded
on an, at the time, strong and sophisticated financial sector. The mining houses that
established the modern South Afrcan economy were, and stil are, in essenee
financial companies. During the decade of stagnation in the South Afrcan economy
preceding the 1994 elections, the financial sector was largely kept intact. Thus, while
the financial sector and regu1atory fTamework were lagging behind the general
economic development in Asia, it was ahead of the general economic devel9pment in
South Afrca.
This difference probably explains why the currency crisis that struck in South Afrca
in 1996 and again in 1998 did not trigger a financial crisis. In addition, South Afrca
was no stranger to currency crises and capital flight and had gained experience in
handlIng such situations. As sanctions against South Afrca were stepped up durng
the early 1980s, both short- and long-term capital fled the country during a relatively
short period of time. South Afrca had lIttle access to international financial markets
during the sanctions era. Moreover, it had to repay much of its outstanding debt
faster than the initial borrowing conditions indicated. South Afrca therefore had to
ru a surp1us on its current account on the balanee of payment and never had much
opportunity to bui1d up reserves. The South Afrcan balanee of payment situation
thus resembled the development the Asian countres have gone through, but for very
different reasons, and with different consequences.
After sanctions were lIfted in 1993, the credit constraint on South Afrca was eased
substantially, and the current account turned into deficit from 1994 onwards. The
South Afrcan authorities to ok a very cautious stand on the reintegration into the
world financial markets. They were aware of the large distortions that had developed
21
during the sanctions period. Therefore, exchange controls were lifted only gradually.
Controls were first removed on transactions on the current account of the balanee of
payment (e.g. transactions related to trade and transfers). The sec ond major step was
to lIft controlon foreign residents' transactions on the capital account. The remaining
control for the time being is on South Afrcan citizens' transactions on the capital
account of the balanee of payment. Apparently, local citizens are seen as a greater
danger to financial stability than foreigners. In South Afrca this is partly because
South Afrcan migrants' savings in South Afrca exceed South Africa's foreign
reserves. Again the balanee of payment situation resembled the Asian case, but while
South Afrca took precautions to stem the outflow, Asia did not.
South Afrca experienced a currency crisis in 1996 when the currency depreciated by
about 20 percent. The market had just recovered from the 1996 crisis, and monetar
policy had started to ease when the contagion effect of the Asian crisis struck. The
policy response in both cases was a tightening of monetary policy i.e. an increase in
interest rates in order to defend the exchange rate. The interest rate hikes were
nevertheless nowhere near the first response in Asia. Because of the much sounder
financial situation, the dose of austerity measures needed to stabilize the situation and
restore confidenee was much small er in South Afrca. As the economic fundamentals
such as the sound financial sector, moderate levels of debt and areasonable internal
and external balanee again came to the fore, the exchange rate rec1aimed much of lost
terrtories. Furthermore, after having been put on Moody's watch lIst for possible
downgrading, South Afrcan bonds eventually maintained their rating.25
The South Afrcan economy has nevertheless stagnated over the past year. The
slowdown and stagnation have undoubtedly been worsened by the contagion effect of
the Asian crisis, but South Afrca's major problem is that the economy never really
to ok off after the first euphoria following the multiparty elections. The economy stil
suffers from strctural problems inherited from the apartheid years, where the most
serious problem is the substantial mismatch between the skil- and productivity level
on the one hand and the wage levels and industri al structure on the other (Nordås
1996). This state of affairs renders South African companies uncompetitive in
international markets and constitutes an obstac1e to growth. The policy strategy that
was designed in order to foster competitiveness, stimulate growth, foreign investment
and exports, was a gradual easing of monetary policy, liberalization of trade and
international capital flows and a tight fiscal polIcy. The currency crisis jeopardized
this strategy. Monetar policy could not be eased, due to higher import inflation,
while the other policy measures remain in place leaving the overall polIcy stanee very
tight. Thus, the Asian crisis did not cause South Afrca's economic problems, but it
has lImited South Afrca's ability to address the problems through the easing of
macroeconomic polIcy.
The South African experience underscores the points made in section 2, name1y that a
currency crisis does not have to develop into a financial and economic crisis if the
fundamentals both at the macro and the firm leve1 are sound in the first plac~.
25 Moody's is a credit rating agency which has given South Africa the lowest investrent grade.
Standard and Poor, another credit rating agency, has only given South Africa a credit rating.
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4.3.2 Mozambique
Mozambique started its recovery in 1993 after a prolonged war. Growth has
continued unabated so far in 1998, mainly driven by domestie dynamics, foreign
investment in mega-projects and substantial transfers of foreign aid. Mozambique has
very c10se economic relations with South Afrca. It is the most important trading
parner, source of foreign investment and source of remittances from workers abroad.
South Afrcan companies have featured prominently in new investment and
development initiatives such as the Maputo corrdor, and a huge aluminium smelting
plant is being built. The potential impact on Mozambique of the Asian crisis is
therefore mostly an indirect impact through lInks to South Afrca.
Mozambique's encouraging development since 1993 has gained momentum and the
flow of foreign funds from donors and South Afrcan investors has continued
unabated in spite of turmoil in international markets and the stagnation in South
Africa. Mozambique's great potential as a tourst destination, source of energy to
regional markets, notably South Afrca, and the country' s enablIng policy
environment have overshadowed the general negative sentiment about developing and
emerging markets. Thus, as long as South Afrca avoids a credit crunch, which it
most lIkely wil, the investment inflows wil probably continue.
The dominanee of foreign inflows as a source of development funding in
Mozambique is, however a cause for concern. There is the danger that Mozambique
wil experience the same as Latin-America and South East Asia has experienced
before. Rapid growth fuelled by large inflows of foreign fuding, a huge current
account deficit, rapid accumulation of debt, even though it is on concessionary terms,
constitute the ingredients of a looming crisis. Since the debt is denominated in hard
foreign currencies, there is a danger that it can not be serviced when the economy
inevitably reaches a stage where the recovery and catching up phase has run out of
steam. Hopefully both local authorities and donors wil pause to ensure that an
"Icarus" scenario is avoided.26
To sumarize, Mozambique is probably the country in our sample least affected by
the Asian crisis, since its development is overwhelmingly driven by local dynamics
and flows of donor money. Mozambique may, however, draw the lesson from the
Asian crisis that capital inflows, from whichever source, should be scaled to the
country' s absorption capacity in order to avoid serious setbacks further down the line.
4.3.3 Tanzania
Tanzania has a floating exchange rate regime, but the curency is not convertible
outside the East Afrcan Community (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda). The exchange
rate is therefore mainly determined by the supply and demand of foreign exchange in
the local market, which in turn dep end on trade flows and transfers and loans from
donors and others.
Tanzania's exposure to the world market is somewhat higher than the average for
low-income countries (see table 4.1 above). The main exports are agrcultural-based
commodities and minerals. Aneedotal evidence indicates that the mining sector has
26 Icarus flew so high that he got his wings burnt by the sun and crashed to the earth.
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been booming for several years, and it is widely belIeved that the sector is not fully
captured by offcial statistics. If so, this can explain that the Tanzanian shilling was
fairly stable in nominal terms and appreciated in real terms over the past year (Bank
of Tanania 1998) in spite of a recorded worsening of the trade balanee to the tune of
88 percent during the first quarter of 1998 compared to the same period in 1997.
The increased balanee of trade deficit in 1998 had lIttle to do with the Asian crisis.
The reason was rather a dramatie decline in export volumes due to bad weather
conditions in 1997 on the one hand and a shar increase in imports on the other hand
(Bank of Tanzania 1998, RepublIc of Tanzania 1998).
Tanzania's outstanding foreign debt constitutes about 100 percent of GDP, but most
of it is public sector borrowing on concessionary terms. Only 3.9 percent of total debt
were owed by the private sector (Bank of Tanania 1998). This reflects the fact that
Tanzanian private companies have very lItte access to international financial markets
and are consequently lIttle affected by turbulenee in the international financial market.
International credit to Tanzania has declined during the period June 1997 -June 1998,
and is back to the level of the early 1990s. The dec1ine is, however, a result of
donors' impatience with the slow pace of reforms in Tanzania. Finally; FDI has
actually increased substantially over the past few years due to the combined effects of
liberalIzation of external and internal markets and the lifting of sanctions against
South Afrca, which is by far the largest foreign investor in Tanzania. At present,
South Afrcan companies dominate the breweries sector, the financial sector and the
mining sector in Tanzania.
4.3.4 Zambia
Zambia is the country besides South Africa in our study which is most affected by the
Asian economic crisis. Zambia is affected directly through the copper market where
depressed demand and prices have resulted in a dec1ine in export revenue. However,
Zambia is probab1y also the Southern Afrcan country that has been hit hardest by the
El Nino weather conditions. It is therefore diffcult to isolate the effect of the Asian
crisis on Zambia.
The decline in copper prices has rendered the copper mines less attractive to private
investors, and may be one factor that has led to the slow progress in the planed
privatization proceedings. Politieking is, however probably even more important and
the issue is sourng the relations between the Zambian governent and donors (EIU
1998).
Zambia recently finalized trade negotiations with the Southern Afrcan Customs
Union (SACU). The agreement needs to be ratified by the member countres of
SACU, which may take some time. Nevertheless, Zambia is posed to benefit from
free access to the SACU, particularly the South Afrcan market. In the short run,
however, the depreciation of the South Afrcan rand and lower demand in South
Afrca, partlyas a result of the Asian crisis, will postpone the benefits from the trade
agreement.
The Zambian economy would be in deep trouble even in the absenee of the Asian
crisis or bad weather conditions. It is affected by the conflcts in the' region, a
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situation that scares off foreign investors. PolItical conditions and lack of wilingness
or abilIty to implement reforms have led to a sharp dec1ine in donor fundiiig, which
has probably contributed to the deteriorating exchange rate at least to the same extent
as the Asian crisis. Finally the the ZCCM-operated copper mines are in dire straits
and output has dec1ined dramatically due to lack of investment and neglect of
maintenance for a long period of time.
4.3.5 Uganda
The U gandan economy was devastated after wars and decades of mismanagement
when a recovery program was introduced and supported by the IMF in 1986. With a
few setbacks, the economy has recovered steadily, and economic growth has averaged
7.2 percent during the period 1990-1997. This is c10se to the emerging market growth
rates and an outstanding performanee in an African context. The country is, however,
stil a low-income, rual economy with a very small industri al base. Its degree of
integration with the world economy is even smaller than the average for low-income
countries as table 4.1 shows.
Recovery has depended strongly on donor funding of imports - the share of imports
that is funded by export earnings has in fact dec1ined steadily during the recovery
proeess. In this respect Uganda's development is similar to that of Mozambique, and
the same warnings apply to the future development of Uganda. Thus, if growth slows
down or the currency depreciates significantly, the accumulated debt, which has
tripled from USD 1.2 bil. in 1986 to about USD 3.6 bill. in 1998, or c10se to 60
percent of GDP, increasingly becomes a drain on the Ugandan economy. . The debt
burden is in fact already unsustainable and Uganda has benefited under the World
Bank's heavily indebted poor country initiative.
Threats to the U gandan economic development in near future comesfrom escalating
conflicts in Congo, where U gandan forces are involved, and the activities of rebel
forces within Uganda rather than the Asian crisis. This situation represents a drain on
10cal economic resources, it disrupts regional trade and it scares off foreign investors.
4.3.6 Bangladesh
Bangladesh has had an average growth rate of 4.5 percent during the 1990s, with
higher growth rates the last couple ofyears. This has been achieved with areasonably
sound balanee of payment position and reasonably stable prices, but the governent
budget deficit has been high as a share of GDP and the investment rate has been low.
Furher improvement in the economic situation is held back by pOlItical inst~bility and
bottleneeks in infrastrueture, particularly shortages of electricity, which in turn is a
result of the low investment rate.
This year, parts of the country have been devastated by floods during the same period
of time as the Asian economic crisis struck. Therefore, it is diffcult to isolate the
impact of the Asian crisis. What appears to be the case, however, is that the crisis has
had little effect. Bangladesh has low levels of short-term foreign debt, and it has
exchange controis. The exchange rate regime is a crawlIng peg exchange rate which
allows it to adapt to changes in terms of trade and competitiveness. Nevertheless, it
has not kept up with the shar depreciation of the East Asian currencies and
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Bangladeshi manufacturing industries potentially face increased competition,
particularly in the textile industr. However, as mentioned above, East Asian
industries have not been able to exploit their improved competitiveness due to credit
constraints. Hence Bangladeshi manufacturing output has continued to grow during
1997 and 1998 to the tune of about 8 percent in real terms (EIU 1998).
Bangladesh's major export markets are the United States and Europe, which still
show considerable growth. The Asian economic crisis wil consequently not affect
Bangladeshi exports much unless it leads to a sharp declIne in growth performanee in
the OECD.
FDI flows to Bangladesh has slowed down in 1998, and this is attributed to the Asian
crisis (EIU 1998). However, political instability and hurdles over exploration rights
and FDI in the energy sector probably contrbuted as well. Finally, remittances from
workers abroad constitute a large share of total transfers on the current account of the
balanee of payment. Bangladeshi workers are employed in the Middle East and South
East Asia to a large extent. As the Asian economic crisis deepens and oil prices reach
new lows, foreign workers are the first to go both in Asia and in the Middle East.
Remittances from workers abroad may slow down significantly as aresult. So far,
however, there are few signs of a decline in remittances.
5 Conclusions and lessons from the Asian experience
Both the recent financial crisis in Asia and the more or less permanent balanee of
payments and debt crises in Afrca south of the Sahara illustrate the dangers of
encouraging more inflows of foreign funds than what can be productively employed
in the local economy. How much resources can be productively employed in turn,
depends on the extent and quality of local institutions, infrastrueture and human
capital. These assets are complementary to foreign capital, and the retum on the latter
depends on the quantity and qualIty of the former. Thus, when human capital
accumulation, a regulatory framework and macroeconomic polIcy, failed to keep pace
with capital flows, the economy was destabilized and vulnerable to external shocks
and changes in sentiment.
The policy responses to a crisis are usually directed towards two interdependent
objectives, namely the restoration of confidenee and the restoration of economic
fundamentais. However, the policy response appropriate for shoring up confidenee in
order to prevent a crisis from escalating, are not necessarily the same as the polIcy
responses appropriate to restore fundamentals when the situation has turned into a
full-blown economic crisis. To illustrate the point, if a vehicle is accelerating towards
a c1iff, the appropriate measure is to step on the breaks. Once the vehic1e is over the
c1iff, the appropriate measure is rather to try to keep steerage way and opt for a soft
landing. Sometimes it is diffcult to know exactly when the vehic1e is over the c1iff.
In the Asian case, the brakes were tried first. This had proven successful in previous
crises such as the Mexican crisis in 1994 and in South Afrca in 1996. In the Asian
case, it was realized after a while that the economy was already over the c1iff and a
looser macroeconomic polIcy was tried. The situation now appears to be stabilIzing
in Asia, but it is too early to draw any conclusions regarding which crisis management
strategies worked and which did not .
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The lessons of relevanee to the developing countres inc1uded in our study and donors
that can be drawn from the crisis are the following:
~ Large curent account deficits over an extended period of time are not
compatible with sustainable economic development;
~ Fixed nominal exchange rates over a long period of time cause trouble when
the rate of productivity growth and the rate of inflation differ between the
countries which have fixed rates towards each other;
~ Institutional development needs to go hand in hand with economic
development. A sound financial sector and regulatory framework around it
are of particular importance;
~ It is much easier to prevent than to handle a crisis;
~ International financial institutions proved incapable of preventing or even
predieting the crisis.
The high-performing Asian economies have been held out as an example of
successful development by multilateral development ageneies, scholars and others.
Their success has been attributed to export-orientation and openness, high savings
rates and a relatively high level of human capital, while institutional weaknesses have
largely been overlooked. Hopefully, the Asian crisis williead to increased focus on
institutional development, paricularly in the interface between local and international
financial markets. And hopefully openness to international trade and investment is
stil seen as a key to economic development as long as it is combined with sound
macroeconomic management and sound business management. In practice this means
that the leverage in private businesses, the governent deficit and the current account
balanee (net of aid transfers) should be kept at sustainable levels and that exchange
rates should under normal circumstances be flexible enough to adjust to external
shocks in order to ensure that the exchange rate is not allowed to drift 'Yay out of
equilibrium.27
27 During periods of hyperinflation, there is a case for fixing the exchange rate in order to stabilize the
economy. Brazil is a good example that this has worked, and also a good example that the exchange
rate should be allowed to adjust once stability has been achieved.
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Appendix
Currency crisis ~financiai crisis ~ economic crisis
Arecent IMF study by Agenor and Aizenman (1998) explains the contagion effect by
imperfections both in the local and the international financial markets. The typical
situation in many of the Asian market economies is that local banks borrow on the
international capital mark et at a premium reflecting the country risk, and lend to local
customers at a premium reflecting the risk of default and the cost of enforcing the
lending contract. 28 The local customer is typically a firm that borrows for both
investment and working capital. The profits and the productivity of firms dep end on a
number of factors, some of which are volatile and beyond the control of the local
firm. Increased volatility in any such variable may increase the probability of default
on loans, since increased volatilIty implies that a very bad state of nature may last for
long enough that the firm can not recover its costs. Examples of increased volatility
that may have such an effect is the switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a
floating exchange rate regime, which happened in Thailand in July 1997. This
financial market event may trigger the following adjustment proeess:
. The value of the foreign debt in terms of the local currency increases;
. Loca1 banks increase their lending rates to local firms because of an incr.eased risk
of default;
. Local firms' operational costs increase further, and production is scaled back and
workers laid off;
. Local banks may incur losses that affect their ability to service foreign loans;
. The risk premium local banks pay on the international capital market increases;
. This triggers a third round of increases in local interest rates;
. The increased risk premium in international capital markets does not only apply to
the bank that is actually in danger of defaulting, but also other banks perceived to
be in much of the same situation in the country first affected and in similar
countres.
Agenor and Aizenman (1998) show how the degree of integration with the
international capital market affects the real effects of increased volatilIty. Countries
with a small degree of integration and high risk of default at the outset, pay a high,
perhaps even prohibitive risk premium and are not much affected by a higher degree
ofvolatility. In our study, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and Bangladesh
fall into this category. Conversely, countries with a high degree of integration into
international capital markets are perceived to have a risk of default c10se to zero. If
they are perceived as having zero or very low risk of default even after the increase in
volatility, their risk premium is stilllow or nil and increased volatility in the financial
markets has lIttle effect on the real economy. Countries most affected by increased
volatility are those on the verge of being fully integrated into the international
financial markets. They pay a risk premium small enough to sustain ~ignificant
capital flows under normal circumstances. Increased volatility in these cases may
increase the probability of default significantly and hence the risk premium. The
impact on the real economy follows from higher costs of borrowing and higher costs
of enforcing lending contracts. The latter effect stems from the fact that it is more
diffcult to distinguish good investment projects from bad ones in a volatile market.
28 Indonesian companies borrowed directly in the world financial markets to a significant ex.tent.
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Summary
This report first describes the currency, financial and
economic crises in Asia and analyses how the crises
evolved. The second part analyses how the three types of
crises affect selected Norwegian development partners in
Africa and Asia. It is suggested that the currency crisis had
very little impact in the poorest developing partners that
are not integrated into the world financial system. The
currency crisis did, however, spread to South Africa. As
a result the easing of rnonetary policy that was under way
was reversed. The economic crisis on the other hand, has
had a rnore significant irnpact, both in terms of export
demand facing the countries in question and the prices
they obtain on their exports. These losses are, however,
at least partly counterbalanced by cheaper oil imports.
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